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Abstract 
The primary aim of this study is to examine the association between leverage and Real Earnings Management (REM) 
activities. It analyses how leverage is able to reduce earnings management (EM). This study uses Abnormal Cash Flow 
from Operation, Abnormal Production Cost and Abnormal Discretionary Expenses model by Roychowdhury, 2006, as a 
proxy for REM. Using a sample of 3,745 firm-year observations for the period of 2006-2011, which listed on Bursa 
Malaysia, the study find that a significant negative association between leverage and REM. The finding reveals that 
leveraged firms have lower levels of REM. This supports the view that leverage limits the REM activities, which in turn, 
could affect the quality of accounting earnings. 
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1. Introduction 
Schipper, 1989, argues that, earnings management (EM) has a purposeful intervention in the external 
financial reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some private gain.  The issue of EM does not only 
exist in particular countries but also in Malaysia. Aini et al., 2006, find the evidence that, managers engage in 
EM to improve the financial picture portrayed by the financial statement in order to attract security brokers 
and investment trusts. According to prior studies (Yan, 2006 and Aini et al., 2006), opportunistic EM practice 
via accrual accounting may result in an inaccurate and misleading financial report. This, in turn reduces the 
quality of financial reporting and accounting number. 
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A more recent study, Graham et al., 2005, suggests that managers prefer to manage earnings via real 
economic decisions rather than accounting accruals. They reported that 80 percent of survey participants in 
their study took economic actions such as reducing discretionary expenses on R&D, advertising and 
maintenance in order to meet an earnings target. According to Roychowdhury, 2006, although real earnings 
management (REM) might reduce a firm’s value, managers were more willing to manage earnings through 
real activities such as practices that are less likely to draw auditor or regulatory scrutiny. 
    In the Malaysian context, Salleh, 2009, provides similar findings. He found that a majority of survey 
participants who had experienced missing an earnings target preferred to make economic sacrifices rather than 
manipulate accounting figures. One of the participants in Salleh’s study said: 
 
   “We sit down in our third quarter meeting, look into the figures then try  
      to reduce expenses like advertising, travelling and R&D. These actions 
      are within our control” (p.166). 
 
A review of literature on earnings management highlights that leverage limit EM (Jelinek, 2007 and 
Wasimullah et al., 2010). For example Jelinek, 2007, argues that ‘leverage increases’ reduce EM. ‘Leverage 
increases’ reduce opportunistic earnings management for some reasons: 1) leverage required debt repayment, 
thus reduces cash available to management for non-optimal spending (Jensen, 1986); 2) When a firm employs 
debt financing, it undergoes the scrutiny of lenders and is often subject to lender-induced spending restriction 
(Jensen, 1986).  
However, prior studies (Wasimullah et al., 2010 and Jelinek, 2007) only examined the impact of leverage 
on Accrual Earnings Management (AEM). Therefore, this study extends prior studies by examining the 
impact of leverage on REM activities. 
The main objective of this paper is to examine the impact of leverage on REM. This study uses Abnormal 
Cash Flow from Operation, Abnormal Production Cost and Abnormal Discretionary Expenses model by 
Roychowdhury, 2006, as a proxy for REM. Using a sample of 3,745 firm-year observations for the period of 
2006-2011, listed on Bursa Malaysia, this study finds that a significant negative association between leverage 
and REM. The finding reveals that leveraged firms have lower levels of REM. This supports the view that 
leverage limits REM activities, which in turn, could affect the quality of accounting earnings.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the definition of REM and provides 
evidence from prior studies on the existence of REM. Development of the main hypothesis, based on the 
extensive literature review is presented in Section 3. Section 4 presents the data, sample selection and research 
methodology. Section 5 provides the analysis of results. Finally, the conclusion and suggestions for further 
research are presented in section 6. 
2. Earnings management 
Healy and Wahlen, 1999, suggest that managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring 
transactions to alter financial reports in order to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying 
economic performance of the company, or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported 
accounting numbers. Further, Roychowdhury, 2006, argues that manager exercises REM such as sales 
manipulation and overproduction in order to avoid reporting losses. 
REM is the deviation of ordinary business operation practices in order to make at least some stakeholders 
believe that financial reporting goals have been met through the normal activities of business (Roychowdhury, 
2006). Gunny, 2010, further explains that managers may undertake actions that may have changed the timing 
or structuring of an operation, investment and financial transaction. Other than that, Roychowdhury, 2006, 
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had examined the management of sales, reduction of discretionary expenses, overproduction and reduction of 
R&D expenses. He found that the sample firms are manipulating real activities to avoid reporting losses. 
According to Kim and Sohn, 2012, even though REM can have direct and indirect consequences on current 
and future cash flows of the business, REM activities are more difficult to be detected than AEM and are 
normally less subject to external monitoring and scrutiny. In fact, they are more difficult for average investors 
to understand that make them into believing that business has achieved the targeted normal business goals. 
One of the ways to stay in operation of business is that a company may join another company by means of 
mergers and acquisition. Ghosh and Jain, 2000, claim that leverage increases significantly following mergers 
due to increase in debt capacity. However, companies with high debt are at risk of bankruptcy due to failure in 
settling their external financing which subsequently may put them in another future risk of not being able to 
find other new lenders. Therefore, if this company may want to apply for a new loan, the new lenders may 
impose several conditions to the company as to keep their debt level within reasonable boundaries.  
Prior studies highlight that leverage affect EM activities. Most researchers have argued that leverage 
increases the potential for EM which responds to avoid debt covenant violations (Sweeney, 1994; Dichev and 
Skinner, 2002 and Beatty and Weber, 2003). For example, Sweeney, 1994, provides direct evidence to 
support a debt hypothesis that the larger a firm’s debt to equity ratio, the more likely the firm’s manager is to 
select income increasing accounting procedures. Jaggi and Lee, 2002 examine EM incentives among 
managers in financial distress firms. They argue that the use of discretionary accruals is to convince their 
creditors that the financial distress is temporary nature and will able to recover soon.  
Although the previous literature has provided arguments to the positive association between EM and 
leverage, there is some empirical evidence with the opposite view. Prior studies (Jensen, 1986; Denis and 
Denis, 1993; Jelinek, 2007 and Wasimullah et al., 2010) suggest that leverage limits EM. For example, in 
relation to the control hypothesis theory by Jensen, 1986, Jelinek’s, 2007, findings are consistent with the 
theory used as increased leverage is associated with a reduction of EM in low growth, high free cash flow 
firms. Jelinek, 2007, also makes an additional contribution to the EM literature: that the leverage changes and 
leverage levels have different impacts on EM.  
3. Hypothesis Development 
The impact of leverage on earnings management has two different views. On the first side, prior studies 
suggested that firms with high leverage are more interested in managing their earnings (Dichev and Skinner, 
2002 and Beatty and Weber, 2003). For example, Beatty and Weber, 2003, found that managers use income 
increasing accruals to reduce the likelihood for the firms to violate debt covenant.   
On the other side, Jensen, 1986, suggests that debt creation reduces managers’ opportunistic behaviours. 
This is due to the ‘control hypothesis’ for debt creation. Managers use their own discretion to control the 
firm’s cash flow; however the debt control role begins when managers have an obligation making interest and 
a principal payment.  This implies that high leverage may restrict managers’ ability to manipulate income-
increasing accruals. Hence, based on the above arguments, the hypothesis is developed as follows: 
 
H1:  High leveraged firms are less likely to involve in REM than the lower leveraged firms 
4. Data and methodology 
4.1. Sample Selection and Data Collection 
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The initial sample covers all industry firms in Data Stream Thompson Reuters, excluding financial and 
insurance firms during the period 2006-2011 listed on Bursa Malaysia. This database includes 4,916 firms. 
Consistent with Roychowdhury, 2006, in detecting the real activities manipulation, this study excludes the 
negative residual value of abnormal earnings. The suspect firm-years are those with a positive residual value 
of abnormal earnings which is 4,076 firms. Finally, any missing values and outliers determined in the sample 
firms were excluded and the final sample of 3,745, then, will be used to test the hypothesis developed in the 
current study. 
 
4.2. Measurement for Dependent Variable: Real Earnings Management 
 
Following Roychowdhury, 2006, this study defines REM as actions managers take that deviate from 
normal business practices. Consistent with prior research (Roychowdhury, 2006 and Cohen and Zarowin, 
2010), this study employ three metrics to examine REM, namely abnormal cash flow from operations 
(RES_CFO), abnormal production costs (RES_PROD) and abnormal discretionary expenses (RES_DISEXP). 
Consistent with Roychowdhury, 2006, the study estimates RES_CFO, RES_PROD and RES_DISEXP as the 
residual from the following models, respectively. 
 
4.2.1 Model for RES_CFO 
 
CFOit / Ait-1 = β1 [1/Ait-1] + β2 [Salesit /Ait-1]   + β3 [∆Salesit /Ait-1] + εit 
 
where, 
CFOit  Cash flow from operation of firm i in period t 
Ait-1  Total assets of firm i in year t-1; 
Salesit Sales of firm i in year t  
∆Salesit Sales of firm i in year t less sales of firm i in year t-1;  
εit  A residual term that captures the level of abnormal cash flow of firm i in year t. 
 
4.2.2 Model for RES_PROD 
 
PRODit/Ait-1 = β1 [1/Ait-1] + β2 [Salesit /Ait-1]   + β3[∆Salesit /Ait-1]  + β4[∆Salesit -1 /Ait-1]  + εit  
 
where, 
PRODit The sum of cost of goods sold and change in inventory of firm i in year t; 
∆Salesit-1 Sales of firm i in year t-1 less sales of firm i in year t-2; and all other variables are as 
previously defined.  
 
4.2.3 Model for RES_DISEXP 
 
DISEXPit/Ait-1 =   β1 [1/Ait-1] + β2 [Salesit -1 /Ait-1] + εit 
where, 
DISEXPit The sum of Research and Development (R&D) expenses and Selling, General & 
Administrative (SG&A) expenses of firm i in year t; and all other variables are as 
previously defined. 
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According to Roychowdhury, 2006, and Cohen and Zarowin, 2010, firms that manage earnings upwards 
are likely to have one or all of these accounting effects: (i) unusually low cash flow from operations due to the 
increasing of price discounts or lenient credit terms in order to accelerate sales for the current period, (ii) 
unusually low discretionary expenses due to the aggressive reduction in R&D, advertising and SG&A 
expenses in order to improve earnings for the current period, and (iii) unusually high production costs in order 
to reduce Cost of Goods Sold (COGS), which in turn increase the operating margin for the current period. 
 
4.3. Measurement for Independent Variable: Leverage 
 
There are some arguments on the positive association between leverage and EM, and in contrast other 
arguments on the negative association between leverage and EM. Nevertheless, it is important to highlight the 
negative association between leverage and EM since the current study hypothesize that leverage limits REM. 
Leverage is measured based on the ratio of total liabilities to total assets which is consistent with Sweeney, 
1994; Dichev and Skinner, 2002; Gu et al., 2005; Rashidah and Fairuzana Haneem, 2006.  
 
4.4. Measurement of Control Variables 
 
 According to a literature review, this study includes some of the control variables: net interest expense 
(INTEXP); Return on Assets (ROA); firm size (SIZE); types of auditor (AUDITOR), types of industry (IND) 
and years (YR). Increase in the leverage may result in an increase in interest payment (INTEXP) which 
affects in lower net income (Jelinek, 2007). Jensen (1986) argued that higher interest expense is able to 
control opportunistic behaviour. Hence, this study also controls for INTEXP. Then, ROA is included in this 
study since Kothari et al. (2005) and Jiraporn et al. (2007) found a negative association between EM and 
ROA. The result indicates that the lower the performance of the firm, the higher the possibility for the firm’s 
incentive to engage in EM activity.  
Next, the study controls for firm size. SIZE affects discretionary accruals (Gu et al., 2005 and Aini et al., 
2006). However there are mixed arguments on the direction of its association. On one hand, Gu et al., 2005, 
argued that there is a negative association between size and discretionary accruals. On the other hand, Aini et 
al., 2006, claim that the larger the firm size, the more likely it will choose income decreasing accounting 
accruals to avoid political costs. Lastly, the study also controls for auditor. Big 6/5/4 has a good brand name 
and may provide higher quality of audit and is able to restrict discretionary accruals in management (Becker 
et al., 1998 and Chung et al., 2005). In addition, a dummy industry and year are also included in the study to 
control for industry and year effects. 
 
4.5 Estimation model 
 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that high leveraged firms are less likely to involve in REM than the lower leveraged 
firms, with LEV as the variable used for leverage. Thus, the test of hypothesis 1 is based on the coefficient of 
LEV, β1, in the equation below. In supporting hypothesis 1, it is expected that β1 is negative. The estimation 
model is presented as follows: 
 
RES_REM = β0 + β1LEV + β2INTEXP + β3ROA t-1 + β4SIZE + β5AUDITOR + β6IND + β7YR +εit 
 
where, 
RES_REM RES_CFO, RES_PROD or RES_DISEXP (all the variables are as previously defined and 
this model is separately tested); 
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LEV  total debts scaled by total assets for firm i in year t; 
INTEXP net interest expense on short and long-term debt (total debt) for firm i in year t; 
ROAt-1          prior-year income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets of firm i in year t-1; 
SIZE  logarithm of assets of firm i in year t; 
AUDITOR a dummy variable set, equal to 1 if firms i is audited by a Big 4 auditor in year t and 0 
otherwise;  
IND  dummy for industry of firm i in year t (1 if observation is in industry of the sample and 0 
otherwise); 
YR  dummy for year of firm i in year t (1 if observation is in year of the sample and 0 
otherwise); 
εit  a residual term of the model. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1. Descriptive Analysis 
 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the full sample of observations. The mean for suspected firms 
which engage in REM activities for the three different proxies for REM is different. From the result, abnormal 
discretionary expenses show the highest mean, 36 per cent of suspected firms engage in REM, compared to 
the other two proxies for REM. The mean for leverage is 17 per cent that show the leverage among the 
Malaysian firms in the sample is quite low since their net interest expense on total debt is close to 0. These 
statistical results are consistent with Claessens et al., 1999, and Booth et al., 2001, claim that Malaysia is 
considered as a low-debt country. 
 
Table 1. Summary Statistics for the Full Sample 
 
  RES_CFO RES_PROD RES_DISEXP LEV INTEXP ROAt-1 SIZE 
Mean 0.083 0.223 0.363 0.166 0.010 5.748 5.403 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -137.320 4.070 
Maximum 0.850 2.800 3.410 0.990 0.070 56.960 7.870 
Standard  Deviation 0.960 0.359 0.458 0.167 0.012 10.148 0.608 
Notes: Full sample consists of 3,745 firm-year observations over the period 2006-2011. LEV is measured by total debts scaled by total 
assets; INTEXP is the net interest expense on short and long-term debt; ROAt-1 is the ratio of prior year income before extraordinary 
items to total assets and SIZE is the logarithm of assets. 
 
5.2. Findings 
 
This section reports the testing of the hypothesis developed in Section 3.  This study is separately regressed 
the variables using each estimation model as presented in Section 4.5 where each model represents a different 
proxy for REM (RES_CFO, RES_PROD and RES_DISEXP). The results are presented in the table below. 
The F-statistics for all of the three models is significance at 1 per cent level. With respect to the hypothesis of 
this study, the leverage was negatively associated with REM and significant at the 5 per cent level which 
coefficient of -0.035 is only supported by the first model (RES_CFO). The results were consistent with 
Wasimullah et al., 2010 and Jelinek, 2007, that leverage limits the EM. 
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Table 2. Regression results of Abnormal Cash Flow, Abnormal Production Cost and Abnormal Discretionary Expenses 
    Abnormal   Abnormal   Abnormal 
Cash Flow from Operations Production Cost Discretionary Expenses 
Variables   (RES_CFO)   (RES_PROD)   (RES_DISEXP) 
(Constant) 0.186 0.174 0.559 
(11.39)*** (2.306)** (7.803)*** 
LEV -0.035 0.098 0.028 
(-2.363)** (1.949)* (0.942) 
INTEXP -0.008 -1.104 -0.057 
(-0.039) (-1.699)* (-0.533) 
ROAt-1 0.001 0.000 0.001 
(3.749)*** (0.685) (2.275)** 
SIZE -0.023 0.018 -0.041 
(-9.153)*** (1.620) (-3.866)*** 
AUDITOR -0.001 -0.005 0.023 
(-0.301) (-0.449) (2.266)** 
R2 0.108 0.046 0.088 
Adjusted R2  0.098  0.032  0.072 
F-statistics 10.936*** 3.357*** 5.565*** 
N   1,547    1,202   996 
Notes: The sample consists of three different observations (each model represents an observation) made over the period 2006-2011. LEV 
is measured by total debts scaled by total assets; INTEXP is the net interest expense on short and long-term debt; ROAt-1 is the ratio of 
prior year income before extraordinary items to total assets; SIZE is the logarithm of assets and AUDITOR is coded as 1 if the firm is 
audited by a big 4 auditor and 0 otherwise. 
*, **, *** significant at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively. T-statistics are in parentheses.     
 
The finding is also in line with the ‘control hypothesis’ for debt creation (Jensen, 1986). According to the 
theory, debt can be used to reduce agency cost where managers may have the power to control the firm’s cash 
flow at their own discretion. The control role begins when managers have an obligation to make interest and 
principal payments, which otherwise, will bring the firm into the bankruptcy court. In addition, Jensen (1986) 
claims that debt is an effective control for managers’ discretionary accruals at the point where the firm value 
is maximized, which means that a marginal cost of debt just offsets its marginal benefit within large cash 
flows and low growth firms.  
However, in contrast, the second model (RES_PROD) as a proxy for REM shows a significant positive 
association (with a coefficient of 0.098) with REM at 10 per cent significance level.  In describing the positive 
association between REM and leverage, the findings support with Sweeney (1994) on debt hypothesis. The 
larger a firm’s debt to equity ratio, the more likely the firm’s manager is to select income increasing 
accounting procedures. In addition, the positive association between leverage and EM is also supported by the 
reason of financial distress theory (Jaggi and Lee, 2002 and Fung and Goodwin, 2013) and to avoid debt 
covenant violations reasons (Dichev and Skinner, 2002 and Beatty and Weber, 2003). 
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The third model also shows a positive association between leverage and REM, but, is not significant. In 
addition, the control variables show a significant result with some of the models as the proxy for REM. First, 
INTEXP (with a coefficient of -1.104) has a significant negative association with REM at 10 per cent 
significance level. The result supports Jensen’s, 1986, study which claims that there is an obligation among 
managers to settle both the interest and principal payment. A higher interest payment will constraint managers 
from exercising their own discretion, thus, indirectly reduce the possibility for EM. Second, ROAt-1 is 
significantly positive at 1 per cent and 5 per cent levels respectively with REM in the first and third model. 
This result was consistent with Gunny, 2010. Managers tend to exercise operational discretion, hence, to 
portray a better future performance or to signal future firm value.  
Next, the result of negative significant at the 1 per cent level between SIZE and REM in the first model 
(with a coefficient of -0.023) and third model (with a coefficient of -0.041) is in line with Gu et al., 2005 and 
Norman et al., 2005.  The large firms enjoy more of the benefits of economy of scale and economy of scope, 
thus making them satisfied with their position and restraining them from exercising EM. Lastly, AUDITOR is 
significantly positive with REM which coefficient of 0.023 at the 5 per cent level in the third model. This 
positive association with REM support by Cohen et al., 2008 suggesting that firms shifted from using accrual-
based to REM after SOX. Hence, the study assumes that firms audited by Big 4 auditor that just achieved 
important earnings benchmarks used less AEM and more REM.  
6. Conclusions  
In general, the extant empirical evidence is mixed with both of positive and negative association between 
leverage and EM. Due to the debt hypothesis (Sweeney, 1994), financial distress theory (Jaggi and Lee, 2002 
and Fung and Goodwin, 2013) and to avoid debt covenant violations reasons (Dichev and Skinner, 2002 and 
Beatty and Weber, 2003), researchers have argued that leverage increases the potential for EM. Although the 
previous literature has provided arguments to the positive association between EM and leverage, there is some 
empirical evidence with the opposite view (Jensen, 1986; Denis and Denis, 1993; Jelinek, 2007; and 
Wasimullah et al., 2010). 
Reviews of literature highlight that leverage affect EM activities. Consistent with the argument, this study 
shows that the leverage has a significant negative association with residual cash flow from operations, one of 
the proxies for REM. The result supports the review that leverage is one of the controlling and monitoring 
system which limits REM. Thus, it can specifically shed more light on the factor affecting REM, in order to 
give adequate response to the recent failure firms affected by the exploitation of opportunistic EM, which in 
turn, could affect the quality of accounting earnings. Although this study argues that leverage limits REM, the 
findings only document an association rather than a causal relationship between leverage and REM. 
Therefore, the causality of leverage leading to lower REM requires further theoretical and empirical 
examination.  
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